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Commentary:
A Response to Professor Swift
The Hearsay Rule at Work:

Has It Been Abolished De Facto
by Judicial Discretion?
Myrna S. Raeder*
Professor Swift's work is extremely valuable for its insights into how judges actually apply the hearsay rules when
evaluating categorical exceptions. Too often we make assumptions without examining their factual underpinnings. Professor
Swift pierces the mist of commonly held beliefs to report that
while Rules 803(1)-(4) and 803(6) of the Federal Rules of Evidence are generally being interpreted rigorously in federal
court to exclude statements made by risky declarants, judges
are liberally admitting statements of crime victims, particularly
children, when offered by federal prosecutors. In addition,
judges sometimes rely on trustworthiness to admit evidence
pursuant to exceptions which have no discretionary criteria.
Prosecutors are the most prolific as well as the most successful
hearsay users. Criminal defendants, and to a lesser extent civil
plaintiffs, appear to be the hearsay losers, while civil defendants seem hardly to be playing the game at all.1 This Comment
focuses on some of Professor Swift's findings and their place in
the larger hearsay picture.
I.

WHY ARE CIVIL DEFENDANTS UNDERREPRESENTED?

Professor Swift's study-identifying that civil defendants
* Professor of Law at Southwestern University School of Law, Los Angeles, California. The research for the catchall study was funded by Southwestern's Buchalter Chair.
1. See Eleanor Swift, The HearsayRule at Work: Has It Been Abolished
De Facto by Judicial Decision?, 76 MiNN. L. REV. 473, 481 tbls. I and IV
(1992).
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are substantially under-represented as users of Rule 803(1)-(4)
hearsay and trail both prosecutors and civil plaintiffs in offers
of Rule 803(6) hearsay-may provide important lessons about
trial lawyers' evaluation of hearsay and how hearsay reform
will affect trial practice. Professor Swift's discovery mirrors a
trend I noted in a study of cases involving the Rule 803(24) and
804(b)(5) catchall hearsay exceptions. 2 Civil defendants' underrepresentation is partially a function of the burden of proof
which encourages the introduction of evidence by civil plaintiffs
and prosecutors. However, civil defendants made substantially
fewer offers of Rule 803(1)-(4) hearsay than any other party, including criminal defendants, in both Professor Swift's study3
and my ongoing catchall study.4 Moreover, while intuitively
civil defendants, which include corporations, would appear to
2. My study entailed a search on Westlaw from January 1, 1975 to July 1,
1991 for criminal and civil cases referencing Federal Rules 803(24) or
804(b)(5)-the hearsay catchall exceptions. District court cases which resulted
in appellate decisions were eliminated. I included in the study catchall references which were cited as alternative reasons for admission, even though it
might be argued that such references are superfluous. It is my opinion that
such references make it easier for a judge to admit the evidence without having to make hard decisions concerning admissibility and therefore are significant.
The results of the study will be discussed throughout this Comment and
are summarized below for reference.
Number
of cases
where
the party
offered
catchall
evidence

Percent
of
offers

Number
of cases
where
the party
was
successful

Success
rate

Prosecutors
Civil Plaintiffs
Criminal Defendants
Civil Defendants

171
113
75
49

42%
28%
18%
12%

138
49
11
24

81%
43%
15%
49%

Total

408

100%

222

54%

These statistics cannot be considered definitive, given the small number of
cases in some categories and the fact that the cases studied only include hearsay rulings which are available on Westlaw. The number of cases represented
and the statistics derived from them, however, establish relative patterns of
usage and success which provide insight into catchall exception interpretation.
For an earlier study of criminal cases applying the Rule 803(24) and
804(b)(5) hearsay catchall exceptions, see Myrna S. Raeder, Confronting the
Catch-Alls, 6 A.B.A. SEC. CRnm. JUST. 31 (1991).
3. See Swift, supra note 1, at 481 tbl. III.
4. In the catchall study, civil defendants offered hearsay in only 49 cases.
In comparison, prosecutors offered hearsay in 171 cases, over three times more
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have more access to busiiess records than any other party, only
criminal defendants made fewer offers of Rule 803(6) hearsay.5
There is no reason to suppose that hearsay is generally
more helpful to criminal defendants than to civil defendants,
particularly since some civil suits could be brought as criminal
actions. It is also unlikely that the relative absence of civil defendants as hearsay users is based upon their failure to appeal
from adverse verdicts; civil defendants usually have both the
resources and the financial motivation to appeal. Nor can all
civil defense hearsay so clearly fit into an exception that it simply is not objected to at trial. Indeed, Professor Swift noted
that when civil defendants introduce business records, they are
less successful than civil plaintiffs in getting the records
6
admitted.
The most probable reason for the disparity is that parties
who do not have to use hearsay would rather not do so. Since
civil defendants often have control over the major witnesses
who favor their position and can ensure that they testify, they
do not need to rely on hearsay. Discovery permits civil parties
to learn virtually all of the information which will be proffered
at trial. Therefore, the civil defendant can effectively determine which live witnesses will obviate the need to offer
hearsay.
In contrast, criminal defendants may need to offer more
hearsay than civil defendants because they have fewer financial
resources and because witnesses in criminal cases may be unavailable as a result of asserting their Fifth Amendment privilege. In other words, for all of the reasons underlying the
hearsay rule, defendants who can would rather present live testimony. While it might be risky to subject some civil defense
witnesses to cross-examination, counsel may be fearful that jurors will discount any favorable hearsay if they expect to hear
live testimony.
Similarly, civil defense counsel do not want to justify losing
a case because of a hearsay dispute, when the point could have
been established by a witness who has personal knowledge of
the event. The comparatively few appeals concerning exclusion
of defense hearsay in civil cases is understandable if such hearsay is usually not critical. Moreover, when the hearsay dispute
often than civil defendants. Criminal defendants offered hearsay in 75 cases,
about 50% more often than civil defendants. See supra note 2.
5. See Swift, supra note 1, at 481 tbl. IV.

6. Id-

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 76:507

is significant, it is likely to be resolved prior to trial because
many judges require the attorneys to raise objections concerning documents, depositions, and exhibits, as well as other significant evidentiary issues, well before the jury is sworn.
Therefore, defense counsel who are faced with adverse rulings
on pivotal issues may be settling those cases rather than betting
the client's company on disputed hearsay questions.
The low incidence of civil defense hearsay is a fact that
must be considered whenever significant liberalization of the
hearsay rule is suggested in the civil arena. If civil defendants
resist offering hearsay unless they have no other alternative, it
is doubtful that the mere relaxation of the hearsay ban will encourage them to drastically increase their reliance on hearsay.
Therefore, as Professor Swift notes, the real winner of any liberalization of the hearsay rule in the civil context will be civil
plaintiffs.7
II.

WHY ARE PROSECUTORS OVER-REPRESENTED?

Undoubtedly, the high burden of proof in criminal cases is
partially responsible for the prolific use of hearsay exceptions
by prosecutors. The need to demonstrate proof beyond a reasonable doubt encourages prosecutors to introduce every shred
of relevant evidence.
Factors other than the high burden of proof, however, may
be equally important to the prosecutor's high use of hearsay exceptions. First, the absence of effective discovery in federal
criminal cases affects prosecutors as well as defense counsel.
Discovery aids the effective preparation of cases. Given high
case loads, prosecutors often do not learn about statements until the day of the trial, a time when it is too late to obtain additional live witnesses.
Second, the defendant's Fifth
Amendment privilege against self-incrimination similarly hinders the prosecutor's ability to predict the defense case accurately. Therefore, hearsay may be easier to produce than live
testimony in response to a newly raised defense theory. Third,
even if prosecutors may have more resources than criminal defendants, this hardly suggests that their resources are unlimited. Thus, prosecutors may prefer hearsay to locating and
preparing additional witnesses. Fourth, despite the threat of
subpoenas, some witnesses do not want to testify or may tire of
repeatedly appearing in court only to be rescheduled. Finally,
7. Id- at 502-03.
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prosecutors may affirmatively choose to offer hearsay when the
declarant is less appealing than the in-court witness, as in the
case where a police officer testifies to an informer's statements.
If the hearsay rule is relaxed, these forces will continue to exert pressure on prosecutors to present even more hearsay,
which will be tested only by the Confrontation Clause.
III. WHY ARE CRIMINAL DEFENDANTS LOSING THE
HEARSAY BATTLE?
Professor Swift's conclusion that criminal defendants have
less success than any other party in admitting hearsay, while
prosecutors fare best,8 repeats the pattern which also exists in
cases using the catchall hearsay exceptions. Prosecutors were
successful in federal appellate and district courts in eighty-one
percent of their attempts to use catchall hearsay, compared to
criminal defendants who were successful in only fifteen percent
of their attempts.9 At the appellate level, prosecutors had a
sixty-three percent success rate, even subtracting the appellate
cases favoring prosecutors which held that the error was harmless or that no error existed.'0 Such results cannot be explained by the inability of prosecutors to appeal from acquittals.
There simply are not that many acquittals in federal court, the
rate is at best in the twenty percent range.": Because a large
number of the criminal cases which result in convictions are
appealed,' 2 it is likely that the cases available on Westlaw are
representative of disputes about contested catchall hearsay.
It is possible that trial judges are admitting defense hear8. I- at 482-83.
9. Of 171 attempts to introduce catchall hearsay, prosecutors were successful in 138 (81%) cases-118 appellate cases and 20 district court cases. Of
75 attempts to introduce catchall hearsay, criminal defendants were successful
in 11 (15%) cases-appellate courts admitted the catchall hearsay (and reversed the district courts' decision to exclude the hearsay) in six cases, district
courts admitted the catchall hearsay offered by the criminal defendants in five

cases. See supra note 2.
10. Of the 171 appellate and district court cases in which prosecutors offered catchall hearsay, see supra note 2, 142 cases represent appellate court decisions. Of the 142 appellate court decisions, prosecutors were successful in 118
cases. Of the 118 successful cases, the court admitted the hearsay holding that
the error was harmless or that no error existed in 29 cases. The remaining 89

successful cases constitute 63% of the total 142 appellate court cases.
11. See U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, SOURCEBOOK OF CRnImNAL JusTicE
STATISTICS-1989, at 498 tbl. 5.21 (Timothy J. Flanangan & Kathleen Maguire

eds., 1989) (listing past statistics).
12. See id at 527 tbl. 5.52.
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say, but defendants are convicted despite such evidence, resulting in appeals which do not reflect their true success rate. Such
over-admission of defense hearsay, however, would likely be
discussed in a way not currently reflected by the ubiquitous
harmless error analyses undertaken by appellate courts. Furthermore, district court decisions in the catchall context also
reflect a substantial disparity between the success rate of prosecutors and defense counsel. 13 At best, criminal defendants may
be effectively introducing inconsequential hearsay. Ultimately,
however, one must wonder why prosecutors fare so much better than civil plaintiffs when introducing hearsay, as well as
why civil defendants are much more successful than criminal
defendants, results mirrored in the catchall cases. 14
Professor Swift explains the plight of criminal defendants
by referring to their reliance on risky declarants.1 5 While her
introduction of the risky declarant is a genuine contribution to
hearsay analysis, the catchall results do not clearly support this
interpretation. Admittedly, defendants attempted to introduce
their own statements or those of potentially biased witnesses,
but so did prosecutors-and with better success. 16 Nor does the
risky declarant analysis explain why courts often admit statements by the defendant's cohorts or accomplices which are introduced by prosecutors under the catchall exceptions, but
usually exclude such statements as untrustworthy when offered by the defense. 17 As Professor Swift points out, courts
also admitted statements of children in sexual abuse cases, de13. See Raeder, supra note 2, at 31.
14. Civil plaintiffs using catchall hearsay were successful in 49 of 113
(43%) attempts. Civil defendants using catchall hearsay were successful in 24
of 49 (49%) attempts. See supra note 2. Success in civil cases includes district
court admissions, appellate affirmances of admitted catchall hearsay, and appellate reversals of excluded catchall hearsay.
15. See Swift, supra note 1, at 486-90; see also Eleanor Swift, Abolishing
the Hearsay Rule, 75 CAL. L. REv. 495, 508-13 (1987).
16. Compare United States v. Chapman, 866 F.2d 1326, 1329-32 (11th Cir.)
(upholding admission of hearsay of disaffected spouse offered by prosecutor),
cert. denied, 493 U.S. 932 (1989) with United States v. Fredericks, 599 F.2d 262,
264-66 (8th Cir. 1979) (upholding exclusion of hearsay uttered by defendant's
brother's girlfriend which was offered by the defense).
17. Compare United States v. Doerr, 886 F.2d 944, 953, 956 (7th Cir. 1989)
(upholding admission of an accomplice's grand jury testimony offered by prosecutors after accomplice refused to testify despite grant of immunity) and
United States v. Workman, 860 F.2d 140, 143-44 (4th Cir. 1988) (upholding admission of taped statement of deceased codefendant offered by prosecutor),
cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1078 (1989) with United States v. Colson, 662 F.2d 1389,
1392 (11th Cir. 1981) (upholding exclusion of evidence of taped conversation
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spite the children being risky declarants. 18
Professor Swift's alternative hypothesis that discretionary
rulings in criminal cases usually benefit the prosecutor deserves consideration, with the caveat that rulings will favor the
defense when a judge believes that the defendant is innocent or
that the prosecution's evidence is overwhelming. 19 This premise is supported by her finding that judges were more willing to
reverse in civil cases than in criminal cases, 20 which was also
true in the catchall context. Arguably, the Confrontation
Clause should resolve any doubt against admitting prosecutorial
hearsay in favor of exclusion, while the defendant's right to due
process should resolve any doubt against admitting defense
hearsay in favor of admission. However, district court judges
generally do not appear to give criminal defendants the benefit
of such doubts, and appellate judges often appear to be less concerned about criminal defendants than civil litigants. Thus, any
relaxation of the hearsay rule in the criminal context will permit defendants to introduce more of their hearsay, but is also
likely to result in prosecutors deluging the trial with hearsay,
subject only to shrinking constitutional constraints.2 ' Even to
the extent constitutionally permitted, such wholesale use of
hearsay would change the way criminal trials look and might
lower public acceptance of verdicts. 22
between police and twice convicted felon concerning attempts to procure false
testimony against the defendant offered by defense).
In 27 catchall cases in which prosecutors offered accomplice evidence, they
were successful in 20 (74%) cases. In comparison, in 19 catchall cases in which
criminal defendants offered accomplice evidence, they were successful in only
three (16%) cases. See supra note 2 (providing background on the study).
Most accomplice hearsay offered by prosecutors were argued alternatively as
Rule 801(d)(2)(E) co-conspirator statements, or as Rule 804(b)(3) statements
against interest.
18. See Swift, supra note 1, at 490.
19. Id at 483.
20. Id. at 479-80.
21. See generally Roger Park, A Subject Matter Approach to Hearsay Reform, 86 MIcH. L. REv. 51, 88-104 (1987) (advocating that rules excluding hearsay in civil cases should be curtailed while rules excluding hearsay in criminal
cases should not be curtailed because they serve the additional function of
shielding the accused from misuse of government power).
22. Compare Charles Nesson, The Evidence or the Event? On Judicial
Proofand the Acceptability of Verdicts, 98 HARV. L. REV. 1357, 1372-75 (1985)
(arguing that hearsay rules promote the stability of verdicts because the rules
protect the public's immediate and continuing acceptance of jury verdicts)
with Roger Park, The HearsayRule and the Stability of Verdicts: A Response
to ProfessorNesson, 70 MINN. L. REv. 1057, 1062-72 (1986) (arguing that Pro-
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IV. HAS THE HEARSAY RULE BEEN ABOLISHED BY
JUDICIAL DISCRETION?
I question whether the hearsay rule still functions as an effective barrier to out-of-court statements which do not fit the
traditional exceptions. By providing pieces of the puzzle which
must be integrated into the larger hearsay picture, Professor
Swift's findings actually support, rather than challenge, my belief. The categorical hearsay exceptions currently appear to act
as a security blanket; a judge's careful analysis of these hearsay
exceptions is often an academic exercise which masks the erosion of the hearsay ban under the guise of the discretionary
catchall exceptions. Under the present structure of the Federal
Rules of Evidence, it makes sense for judges to interpret the
specific exceptions as written. Given the highly discretionary
approach to hearsay employed in the catchall exceptions, there
is no need to distort the specific exceptions. In other words, the
catchall exceptions always provide a safety valve when tough
decisions must be made.
Since the enactment of the Federal Rules of Evidence,
there have been more than 400 decisions which discuss admission under the catchall exceptions, 2s a number which is clearly
high given that the exception was intended to cover the "exceptional" case.2 Fifty-four percent of the hearsay offered under
the catchall exceptions is being admitted. 25 If criminal cases
alone are considered, sixty-one percent of catchall hearsay is
being admitted.26 Moreover, since the enactment of the Federal Rules of Evidence, slightly more than 100 cases cited the
catchall exceptions as an alternative to Rule 803(6)-(10), of
27
which approximately seventy were references to Rule 803(6).
Roughly eighty cases cited the catchall exceptions as an alterfessor Nesson's thesis that hearsay rules protect the stability of verdicts is

flawed).
23. See supra note 2.
24. See S. REP. No. 1277, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 20 (1974), reprinted in 1974
U.S.C.C.A.N. 7051, 7066.
25. Of 408 cases available on Westlaw involving catchall hearsay, the offering party was successful in 222 (54%) cases. See supra note 2.
26. One hundred forty-nine of 246 (61%) criminal cases were successful.
See supra note 2.
27. This is based on a Westlaw search from January 1975 through August
1991 for federal cases citing the catchall exception 803(24) or 804(b)(5) and the
specific exception 803(6)-(10). District court cases which resulted in appellate
court decisions were eliminated.
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native to Rule 8 03 (l)-( 4 ).2s In criminal cases, the catchall exceptions were cited about sixty times in decisions as an
alternative to declarations against penal interest, and more
than twenty times as alternatives to both former testimony and
co-conspirators statements. 29 The current pressure points in
the criminal justice system are reflected by eleven child abuse
cases citing the catchall exceptions 30 and the numerous "war on
drugs" cases which provide about thirty percent of the criminal
catchall citations since 1985.31 These latter statistics reflect citations, not admissions, and may simply demonstrate caution on
the part of litigators who are attempting to be overly inclusive
when arguing the admission of hearsay. However, the citation
of the catchall exceptions implies that in a fair number of cases
it is considered risky to cite only a traditional hearsay exception, arguably because it is doubtful that the hearsay fits comfortably into the categorical criteria. At a minimum, such
citation indicates that litigators in the hearsay trenches view
the catchall exceptions seriously and believe that judges are
willing to apply them.
Undoubtedly, the mere existence of the catchall exceptions
encourages litigants to introduce hearsay that is problematic
under the traditional exceptions. Highly dubious business
records have become grist for the catchall exceptions. 32 While
the absolute number of cases admitting evidence clearly violating 803(6) is small, more decisions admit hearsay referring to
both 803(6) and 803(24) to avoid answering hard questions
about whether the hearsay fits into the traditional rule at all.
to avoid the ban on
Similarly, Rule 803(24) is being used
33
prosecutorial records found in 803(6).
The catchall exceptions also mask the introduction of other
types of hearsay which defy admission under the specific excep28. The same methodology employed in supra note 27 was used to identify
criminal and civil cases citing the catchall exceptions as an alternative to Rule

803(1)-(4).
29. The same methodology employed in supra note 27 was used to identify
criminal cases citing the catchall exceptions as an alternative to Rules

804(b)(3), 804(b)(1), and 801(d)(2)(E).
30. These cases were derived from the study described in supra note 2.
31. Drug cases were located by a Westlaw search for criminal cases referencing "drug!, heroin, cocaine, or marijuana" from January 1985 through August 1991 and comparing this number to the total number of criminal catchall
cases during the same time frame.
32. See Raeder, supra note 2, at 33.
33. See, e.g., United States v. Simmons, 773 F.2d 1455, 1458-59; (4th Cir.
1985); cf. Swift, supra note 1, at 492 n.57.
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tion categories. Prosecutors attempted to introduce grand jury
testimony in thirty-seven cases pursuant to the 804(b)(5) catchall exception.3 4 In twenty-nine of these cases, the court admitAnother hidden catchall category
ted the hearsay.3 5
encompasses written and oral statements made to law enforcement officials which are prior consistent or inconsistent statements not fitting the Rule 801 criteria. 36 A growing number of
cases appear to include statements to law enforcement officials
by declarants not present at trial.3 7 Such declarants have
ranged from accomplices to spouses, victims, and truly disinterested individuals.3 8
Professor Swift found patterns indicating consistency of application by judges in interpreting the categorical exceptions.
Even within the hidden catchall categories, however, admissibility of any particular catchall statement is quite difficult to
predict. Such erosion of the hearsay rule is probably the worst
of all worlds for litigators who must decide which cases to try
by evaluating the potentially admissible evidence. Trials occur
when one party believes that the evidence supports a very different result than that offered by opposing counsel. In determining whether to settle, litigators analyze their own evidence
as well as that of their opponent. The catchall exceptions
blind-side litigators from rationally making such decisions.
While the notice provision of the catchall exceptions should
alert the litigator that the rules of the game have changed, notice is sometimes forgiven due to the exigencies of trial practice.3 9 Therefore, the catchall exceptions frustrate the certainty
34. See supra note 2 (discussing the study of catchall hearsay).
35. It is possible that Idaho v. Wright, 110 S. Ct. 3139 (1990), will reduce
the admission of grand jury testimony based on the Confrontation Clause. Id.
at 3147-48 (holding catchall hearsay evidence violates the Confrontation
Clause unless it contains "particularized guarantees of trustworthiness" based
on circumstances that surround the making of the statement). See United

States v. Gomez-Lemos, 939 F.2d 326, 327, 332 (6th Cir. 1991) (holding that the
admission of grand jury testimony violated the Confrontation Clause because
Wright prohibited corroboration from being used to determine reliability).
36. See Raeder, supra note 2, at 33.

37. Id. at 37.
38. Id.
39. See, e.g., United States v. Doe, 860 F.2d 488, 492 (1st Cir. 1988) (notice
impractical and opponent did not contemporaneously object to lack of pre-trial
notice or request a continuance), cert denied, 490 U.S. 1049 (1989); see also
United States v. Bailey, 581 F.2d 341, 348 (3d Cir. 1978) ("requirement of fairness to an adversary contained in the advance notice requirement of Rule
803(24) and Rule 804(b)(5) [is] satisfied when . . . the proponent of the evidence is without fault in failing to notify his adversary prior to trial and the
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that litigators depend upon in analyzing whether to try or settle a case.
The catchall exceptions permit the total erosion of the
hearsay rule by judicial discretion, a result originally suggested
when the Federal Rules were first drafted, but quickly rejected. 40 As currently interpreted, hearsay may be admitted
under the catchall exceptions whenever a party has a good argument that the statements being introduced have equivalent
circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness. 41 Professor Swift
even found that trustworthiness is being used to support the
admission of otherwise inadmissible hearsay pursuant to categorical exceptions.4 2 Obviously, not every catchall reference or
exhortation to trustworthiness results in the admission of evidence. However, the perpetual citation of the catchall exceptions has taken its toll, and the appellate decisions are not
offering an effective stopgap, in part, because they review the
admission of such hearsay for abuse of discretion and harmless
error.
More disturbing, the abuse of discretion standard has infected the review of evidentiary issues concerning questions of
law which should be determined de novo. 43 Both Professor
Swift's findings and my catchall review44 confirm that most
trial court decisions will be upheld on appeal, regardless of
trial judge has offered sufficient time, by means of granting a continuance, for
the party against whom the evidence is to be offered to prepare to meet and
contest its admission").
40. See Myrna S. Raeder, The Effect of the Catchallson CriminalDefend
ants: Little Red Riding Hood Meets the Hearsay WoZf and Is Devoured, 25
LOY. L.A. L. REV.925, 926-27 (forthcoming April 1992).
41. See Raeder, supra note 2, at 37-39; Raeder, supra note 40, at 935-37.
42. See Swift, supra note 1, at 491.
43. See, e.g., United States v. Cherry, 938 F.2d. 748, 757 (7th Cir. 1991)
(holding court did not abuse its discretion by admitting testimony about statements relayed by patient to doctor about the circumstances of her rape); Rasmussen Drilling, Inc. v. Kerr-McGee Nuclear Corp., 571 F.2d 1144, 1149 (10th
Cir.) (stating that appellate court will not disturb trial courts' conduct at trial
proceedings, including rulings on motions and objections, unless it appears
from the record that the trial court abused its discretion), cer, denied, 439 U.S.
862 (1978); see also, Stull v. Fuqua Indus., Inc., 906 F.2d 1271, 1274 (8th Cir.
1990) (finding that district court acted within its discretion when it excluded
hospital record uider 803(4)); Miller v. Keating, 754 F.2d 507, 512 (3d Cir.
1985) (finding that district court did not abuse its discretion when it admitted a
statement under the excited utterance exception of 803(2)); United States v.
Iron Shell, 633 F.2d 77, 85 (8th Cir. 1980) (finding that district court did not
abuse its discretion when it admitted doctor's testimony under 803(4)), cert denied, 450 U.S. 1001 (1981).
44. See Swift, supra note 1, at 478-79; Raeder, supra note 2, at 31.
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which party cites the hearsay exception or which exception
they cite. Thus, even without the catchall exceptions, a party
who convinces the trial court to adopt its position on any given
exception has a significant chance of being upheld on appeal.
One reason this occurs is because appellate courts seem to have
more difficulty holding that district court judges abused their
discretion than holding that they made errors of law. Although
this reflects the reality that appellate judges do not review discretionary decisions de novo, but simply determine whether the
trial court's action exceeded its bounds, another factor must be
considered. Finding an abuse of discretion is an indictment of
the trial judge's behavior which is absent from an abstract pronouncement that the judge misapplied the law. Judges do not
want to chastise their colleagues and are not currently required
to do so.
Indeed, the Supreme Court has not encouraged judges to
engage in rigorous appellate review, even for issues subject to
the de novo standard. Instead, it recently blurred the difference between de novo, clearly erroneous, and abuse of discretion standards in a procedural context, noting that a "district
court would necessarily abuse its discretion if it based its ruling
on an erroneous view of the law or on a clearly erroneous assessment of the evidence." 45 Thus, we should not be surprised
that courts often do not distinguish the nature of review for
Confrontation Clause challenges or evidentiary issues which
raise questions of law from that of discretionary evidentiary
rulings.
The harmless error doctrine further deters careful appellate review by erecting another hurdle which must be overcome
in order to win a reversal. Professor Swift reported that
slightly more cases were saved by harmless error than reversed. 46 Are all such errors really harmless? Harmless error
should be an oxymoron in the catchall context where the evidence is supposed to be the most probative on the issue, yet
that does not stop its frequent invocation. Judge Posner has
analogized the expansive code of constitutional criminal procedure to "the grapes of Tantalus, since the equally expansive
harmless error rule in most cases prevents a criminal defendant from obtaining any benefit from the code." 47 Similarly,
Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 110 S. Ct. 2447, 2461 (1990).
46. See Swift, supra note 1, at 478 tbl. I.
47. United States v. Pallais, 921 F.2d 684, 691 (7th Cir. 1990), cert denied,
45.

112 S. Ct. 134 (1991).
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harmless error coupled with the ever expanding catchall exceptions have hastened the demise of the hearsay ban. Hearsay reformers need to consider the reality of what judges are
currently doing in order to determine whether further change
is desirable, the nature of such change, and the likely winners
and losers in the new hearsay regime.

